

Passwords are Dead:

WebAuthn for the security of webapps


Chris Volny (she/her)

Cisco :: Duo Security :: CloudSSO Services :: Sr. Software Engineer



About Speaker – Chris Volny

10+ years in infosec



NORIS (.NET)

MFA + TS Credentials
Reflective Dependency Graph
XML Transformation / ETL

GM / OnStar (Java)

DataStage / ETL
SSO EE w/ SAP ERP
Connected Vehicle Back-office

VES (C++, Java, Bash)

(libvirt) Android Profiles-MDM
Qt C++ Cross-Domain Bridge
Yocto Linux + CI

Duo Security (Python + JS)

Cloud SAML/M365/OIDC
Twisted + Async Python
JS + React

2008 - 2014

2014 - 2017

2017 - 2021

2021 -

Toledo, OH

Detroit, MI

Ann Arbor, MI



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Agenda



- Why Passwordless?
- History, Auth Factors, and Cryptography
- FIDO and WebAuthn
- Demo and Usage
- System Design Considerations
- Q/A + Resources

Why Passwordless?

Over 80% of hacking breaches involve brute force or the use of lost or stolen credentials.

Verizon DBIR

70 %

of breaches were caused by outsiders.

86 %

of breaches were financially motivated.

43 %

of breaches were attacks on web application, more than double the results from last year.


27 %

of malware incidents can be attributed to ransomware.



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“I Fight for the User.”

“I’m a user too!”




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Passwords: a history

- “something you know”
- Roman Legion – friend from foe
- Defacto computer security since 1960s
 - Fernando Corbató, MIT CTSS
 - ... also first leaks:
 - Spring 1962 printed password file
 - 1966 motd and password files swapped
- We’ve been asking this since 2009:



International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
 FC 2009: Financial Cryptography and Data Security pp 230-237 | [Cite as](#)


Passwords: If We're So Smart, Why Are We Still Using Them?

Authors: [Cormac Herley](#), [P.C. van Oorschot](#), [Andrew S. Patrick](#)

Authors and affiliations

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| B | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| C | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A |
| D | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B |
| E | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C |
| F | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D |
| G | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E |
| H | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F |
| I | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| J | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| K | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| L | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
| M | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K |
| N | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L |
| O | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M |
| P | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| Q | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O |
| R | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P |
| S | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q |
| T | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R |
| U | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S |
| V | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T |
| W | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U |
| X | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V |
| Y | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W |
| Z | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X |

W R I O R F E O E
 E E S V E L A N J
 A D C E D E T C X



Password Complexity / Search Space

- Think: time lock
- Choose: random xor memorable
- Rinse, repeat
- www.grc.com/haystack

GRC's Interactive Brute Force Password "Search Space" Calculator

(*NOTHING* you do here ever leaves your browser. What happens here, stays here.)

1 Uppercase 1 Lowercase 1 Digit 1 Symbol 4 Characters

aA1_

Enter and edit your test passwords in the field above while viewing the analysis below.

Brute Force Search Space Analysis:

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Search Space Depth (Alphabet): | 26+26+10+33 = 95 |
| Search Space Length (Characters): | 4 characters |
| Exact Search Space Size (Count): (count of all possible passwords with this alphabet size and up to this password's length) | 82,317,120 |
| Search Space Size (as a power of 10): | 8.23×10^7 |

Time Required to Exhaustively Search this Password's Space:

| | |
|--|---------------------|
| Online Attack Scenario: (Assuming one thousand guesses per second) | 22.87 hours |
| Offline Fast Attack Scenario: (Assuming one hundred billion guesses per second) | 0.000823 seconds |
| Massive Cracking Array Scenario: (Assuming one hundred trillion guesses per second) | 0.000000823 seconds |

Note that typical attacks will be online password guessing limited to, at most, a few hundred guesses per second.


Enter Password Managers

- Impossibly long passwords for everything
- Encrypted with one “strong” password
 - Hope you don’t forget it
 - Hope no one copies it
 - Hope that password was “strong”

The screenshot shows a password manager interface. At the top, there is a 'Back' button. Below it, a long password 'Vh0zGVIAKdHMOEhtVn523sVJZbOfRf0N' is displayed with a copy icon and a refresh icon. A green progress bar indicates the password's strength. Below the password, there is a 'SHOW HISTORY' button. On the left, the 'Password length' is set to 32, with a slider and three radio button options: 'Easy to say', 'Easy to read', and 'All characters' (which is selected). On the right, there are four checkboxes for password requirements: 'Uppercase', 'Lowercase', 'Numbers' (all checked), and 'Symbols' (unchecked). At the bottom right, there is a red 'FILL PASSWORD' button.

Enter Multi-Factor

- Defense in depth
 - “something you know”
 - “something you have/are”
- “Quick, where’s my phone/YubiKey?”
- Variants:
 - Voice/SMS 2FA Hijack / Phishing
 - OTP Codes Exfiltrate / Phishing
 - Push Great - Duo
 - Certificates/PKI Great - WebAuthn
 - Maybe SE/TPM stored Excellent



Are you logging in to Acme Corp?

📍 Ann Arbor, MI, US

🕒 8:31 AM

👤 narrowway



Deny





Approve

Enter Single Sign-on

- Social Login Wild West
- SAML/OIDC Enterprise


```
1: <saml:AttributeStatement>
2:   <saml:Attribute
3:     xmlns:x500="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500"
4:     NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
5:     Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.42"
6:     FriendlyName="givenName">
7:     <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string"
8:       x500:Encoding="LDAP">John</saml:AttributeValue>
9:   </saml:Attribute>
10:  <saml:Attribute
11:    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
12:    Name="LastName">
13:    <saml:AttributeValue
14:      xsi:type="xs:string">Doe</saml:AttributeValue>
15:    </saml:Attribute>
16:  <saml:Attribute
17:    NameFormat="http://smithco.com/attr-formats"
18:    Name="CreditLimit">
19:    xmlns:smithco="http://www.smithco.com/smithco-schema.xsd"
20:    <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="smithco:type">
21:      <smithco:amount currency="USD">500.00</smithco:amount>
22:    </saml:AttributeValue>
23:  </saml:Attribute>
24: </saml:AttributeStatement>
```

Figure 7: Attribute Statement



What are Security Keys?

- We see these a lot in MFA
- What are they?
 - Secure Enclave (SE)
 - Tamper / extraction resistant
 - Asymmetric cryptography
 - Can embed PK Credentials
 - Sometimes built in (platform)
 - Touch ID
 - Sometimes a peripheral (external)
 - YubiKey
 - Can use to unlock bigger vaults



(A)Symmetric Cryptography

- Symmetric
 - same key for crypt/decrypt
 - Confidentiality
 - Secures data at rest + transport session
 - DES, AES, Blowfish
- Asymmetric
 - One key for crypt, one for decrypt
 - RSA 1977 (Ellis/Cocks '73)
 - Confidentiality and Integrity
 - Secures transport negotiation ('web)
 - RSA, DE, EC
 - SSH, PGP, TLS



Key
generation

$$n = P * Q$$
$$d * e = 1 \bmod \Phi(n)$$

Encryption

$$c = m^e \bmod n$$

Public Key(n,e)

Decryption

$$m = c^d \bmod n$$

private key (d)

FIDO Timeline/Philosophy

- Timeline
 - 2009 – PayPal and Validity Sensor talks
 - 2012 – FIDO Alliance Founded
 - 2014 – Samsung GS5 fingerprint e-shop
 - 2015 – FIDO1 published + BT/NFC
 - 2018 – FIDO2 published **CTAP/WebAuthn**
 - 2019 – Wide platform adoption
- Philosophy
 - Strong crypto
 - Limited scope **Think: cookies + domain**
 - Device attestation **Which devices to trust**



FIDO Platform/Browser Support

Updated 6/29/2020

| U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API |
|--|-------------------|--|-------------------|--|-------------------|--|------------------|
|  Chrome/Windows  | |  Edge/Windows  | |  Firefox/Windows  | |  Safari/iOS  | |
| U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 |
| USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Hello | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Hello | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Hello | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat |
| U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API |
|  Chrome/Android  | |  Edge/Android  | |  Firefox/Android  | |  Safari/macOS  | |
| U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 |
| USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat |
| U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API | U2F API | WebAuthn API |
|  Chrome/macOS  | |  Edge/macOS  | |  Firefox/macOS  | | | |
| U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | U2F | CTAP2 | | |
| USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | USB NFC BLE | USB NFC BLE Plat | | |


Implemented / Stable

In Development

Not Supported / No ETA

FIDO2 = CTAP + WebAuthn

- Client-to-Authenticator Protocols (CTAP)
 - Hardware to OS API / Transport
 - System calls **Windows Hello**, **libfido2**
 - USB, NFC, BLE, TPM Authenticators
- Web Authentication API (WebAuthn)
 - Just web applications
 - JavaScript API in browsers
 - Server-side libraries





FIDO2 = CTAP + WebAuthn

- Web Authentication API (WebAuthn)
 - JavaScript API in browsers



```
const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({  
  publicKey: publicKeyCredentialCreationOptions  
});
```

```
const credential = await navigator.credentials.get({  
  publicKey: publicKeyCredentialRequestOptions  
});
```

Registration




Login




Demonstrations

- <https://webauthn.io> (Duo Labs) (Android)



- <https://www.thevolny.net/> (me) (OS X)



Welcome


This is a homepage for thevolny.net, a work in progress.

This is rendered *markdown*, served via Django, and loaded into a react UI.

User authentication is strictly passwordless via restauthn and webauthn-client (see github).
See my past or upcoming Passwordless talks on how those work :-)

My Demo – High Level

- Two Pieces:
 - JS Library
 - Axios with CBOR Interceptors
 - Login, Register functions
 - Django Module + App
 - Django REST Framework
 - CBOR render/parsers (some base64)
 - Authenticator, LoginToken models
 - ApiViews
 - Really simple templates for testing



| Name | Value |
|------------------|--|
| Request URL | https://www.thevolny.net/api/auth/login/begin/ |
| Request Method | POST |
| Status Code | 200 OK |
| Remote Address | 54.165.58.209:443 |
| Referrer Policy | same-origin |
| Response Headers | Allow: POST, OPTIONS Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 295 Content-Type: application/cbor Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 18:48:09 GMT Referrer-Policy: same-origin Server: gunicorn |

Webauthn Login Begin

Webauthn Login Begin View

Given an anonymous user, extract authentication data from request, use it to authenticate the user, generate a webauthn challenge, store state in session, and return challenge as response.

GET /api/auth/login/begin/

Django REST framework

chris

Webauthn Login

Webauthn Login

Webauthn Login Complete View

Given anonymous user, state from login-begin in session, and the client's response, complete the login ritual, and if valid, log the user in.

GET /api/auth/login/

```
HTTP 405 Method Not Allowed
Allow: POST, OPTIONS
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Accept

{
  "detail": "Method \"GET\" not allowed."
}
```

Media type: application/cbor

Content:



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My Demo – JS Axios

```
export const axios_cbor = axios.create();
axios_cbor.defaults.xsrfHeaderName = "X-CSRFToken";
axios_cbor.defaults.xsrfCookieName = "csrftoken";
axios_cbor.defaults.withCredentials = true;
axios_cbor.defaults.headers['content-type'] = 'application/cbor';
axios_cbor.defaults.method = 'POST';
axios_cbor.interceptors.request.use(cborRequestInterceptor);
axios_cbor.interceptors.response.use(cborResponseInterceptor);
```

```
/**
 * cborRequestInterceptor
 *
 * perform CBOR encoding and set responseType to arraybuffer
 * on outbound requests with content-type application/cbor.
 */
export const cborRequestInterceptor = async function (request) {
  if (request.headers['content-type'] === 'application/cbor') {
    request.data = await encodeAsync(request.data);
    request.responseType = "arraybuffer"
    return request;
  }
  return request;
};

/**
 * cborResponseInterceptor
 *
 * perform CBOR decoding on inbound responses with
 * content-type application/cbor.
 */
export const cborResponseInterceptor = async function (response) {
  if (response.headers['content-type'] === 'application/cbor') {
    const [data] = await decodeAll(Buffer.from(response.data));
    response.data = data;
    return response;
  }
  return response;
};
```

My Demo – JS Login

```
function login(payload, setmessage) {
  const success_callback = (res) => {
    console.log('webauthn-login successful.', {res});
    setData({...data, user: res.data.user});
    setmessage('Logged in successfully!', 'success')
    setTimeout(() => setmessage("", ""), 1000)
    setShowLogin(false)
    window.localStorage.setItem('username', res.data.user.username)
  };
  const failure_callback = (error, code) => {
    console.log(`webauthn login failed.`, {error, code});
    setmessage('Failed authentication', 'danger')
  };
  webauthn_login(payload, success_callback, failure_callback);
}
```

```
export const webauthn_login = (payload,
  success_callback,
  failure_callback = (error, code) =>
    console.log("webauthn-login failed:", code, error),
  beginurl = '/api/auth/login/begin/',
  completeurl = '/api/auth/login/',
  ax = axios_cbor) => {

  const credentials_callback = (opts) => navigator.credentials.get(opts);
  const complete_payload_callback = (payload, assertion) => {
    return {
      ...payload,
      "credentialId":      new Uint8Array(assertion.rawId),
      "authenticatorData": new Uint8Array(assertion.response.authenticatorData),
      "clientDataJSON":    new Uint8Array(assertion.response.clientDataJSON),
      "signature":          new Uint8Array(assertion.response.signature),
    };
  };

  return webauthn_internal(payload, success_callback, failure_callback, credentials_callback,
    complete_payload_callback, beginurl, completeurl,
    WEBAUTHN_LOGIN_FAIL_BEGIN, WEBAUTHN_LOGIN_FAIL_COMPLETE, ax);
};
```

```
export const webauthn_internal = (payload, success_callback, failure_callback,
  credentials_callback, complete_context_callback, beginurl,
  completeurl, begin_failure_code, complete_failure_code, ax) => {
  console.log('webauthn:', {'begin': beginurl, 'complete': completeurl});
  ax.post(beginurl, payload)
    .then(res => res.data)
    .then(opts => credentials_callback(opts))
    .then(auth => {
      ax.post(completeurl, complete_context_callback(payload, auth))
        .then(res => success_callback(res))
        .catch(error => failure_callback(error, complete_failure_code));
    }).catch(error => failure_callback(error, begin_failure_code));
};
```



My Demo – Django Models

```
class LoginToken(models.Model):
    token = models.CharField(_('Token'), max_length=64, primary_key=True)
    user = models.ForeignKey(get_user_model(), related_name="tokens", on_delete=models.CASCADE)
    created = models.DateTimeField(_('Created'), auto_now_add=True)
    expires = models.DateTimeField(_('Expires'))

    class Meta:
        verbose_name = _('Token')
        verbose_name_plural = _('Tokens')

    @property
    def expired(self):
        return timezone.now() > self.expires

    def redeem(self):
        if not self.expired:
            self.delete()
            return self.user
        return False

    def generate_token(self):
        return tokens.default_token_generator.make_token(self.user)

    def renew(self):
        self.expires = timezone.now() + timezone.timedelta(minutes=EXPIRY)
        self.redeemed = None

    def save(self, *args, **kwargs):
        if not self.expires:
            self.renew()
        if not self.token:
            self.token = self.generate_token()
        return super(LoginToken, self).save(*args, **kwargs)

    def __str__(self):
        return f'{self.user.username}: {self.created}'
```

```
class Authenticator(models.Model):
    user = models.ForeignKey(get_user_model(), related_name="authenticators", on_delete=models.CASCADE)
    name = models.CharField(_('Nickname'), max_length=100)
    created = models.DateTimeField(_('Created'), auto_now_add=True)
    cred_id = models.TextField(unique=True)
    cred_data = models.TextField()
    counter = models.PositiveIntegerField(default=1)

    class Meta:
        verbose_name = _('Authenticator')
        verbose_name_plural = _('Authenticators')
        unique_together = ('user', 'name',)

    def inc_counter(self):
        self.counter += 1
        self.save()
        return self

    @property
    def cred(self):
        return websafe_decode(self.cred_id)

    @property
    def credential(self):
        return AttestedCredentialData(websafe_decode(self.cred_data))

    @credential.setter
    def credential(self, cred):
        self.cred_data = websafe_encode(cred)
        self.cred_id = websafe_encode(cred.credential_id)

    def __str__(self):
        return f'{self.user.username}: {md5(self.cred).hexdigest()} ({self.counter})'
```

My Demo – REST Encoding

```
class CborRenderer(BaseRenderer):
    media_type = "application/cbor"
    format = "cbor"
    charset = None
    render_style = "binary"

    def render(self, data, *args, **kwargs):
        return cbor2.dumps(data)

class Base64CborRenderer(BaseRenderer):
    media_type = "text/plain"
    format = "txt"
    charset = "utf-8"

    def render(self, data, *args, **kwargs):
        return base64.b64encode(cbor2.dumps(data))

class Base64JsonRenderer(JSONRenderer):
    def render(self, data, *args, **kwargs):
        return super().render(r_encode(data), *args, **kwargs)

class CborBrowsableAPIRenderer(BrowsableAPIRenderer):
    def get_default_renderer(self, view):
        return Base64JsonRenderer()
```

```
class CborParser(BaseParser):
    media_type = "application/cbor"
    renderer_class = CborRenderer

    def parse(self, stream, *args, **kwargs):
        return cbor2.load(stream)

class Base64CborParser(BaseParser):
    media_type = "text/plain"
    renderer_class = Base64CborRenderer

    def parse(self, stream, *args, **kwargs):
        data = base64.b64decode(stream.read())
        return cbor2.loads(data)
```

My Demo – Login Begin

```
class WebauthnLoginBegin(BaseWebauthnLoginView):
```

```
    """
```

```
    Webauthn Login Begin View
```

Given an anonymous user, extract authentication data from request, use it to authenticate, generate a webauthn challenge, store state in session, and return challenge as response.

```
    """
```

```
    def post(self, request, format=None):
```

```
        logger.warn(f'webauthn-login-begin.{format}: {request.data.keys()}')
```

```
        if request.user.is_authenticated:
```

```
            return Response(dict(detail="Already authenticated"), status=status.HTTP_401)
```

```
        authargs = {k: v for k, v in request.data.items() if k in settings.FID02.LOGIN_FIELDS}
```

```
        if authargs:
```

```
            user = auth.authenticate(request, passwordless=True, **authargs)
```

```
            if user:
```

```
                credentials = [ x.credential for x in user.authenticators.all() ]
```

```
                if credentials:
```

```
                    data, state = SERVER.authenticate_begin(credentials, user_verification=settings.FID02.USER_VERIFICATION)
```

```
                    request.session[settings.FID02.SESSION_STATE_KEY] = state
```

```
                    return Response(data)
```

```
                logger.warn(f'No authenticators registered for {user}')
            else:
```

```
                return Response(dict(detail="No Authenticators"))
```

```
        logger.warn(f'Bad authargs {redact(authargs)}')
```

```
    else:
```

```
        logger.warn(f'Bad payload: {redact(request.data)}')
```

```
    return Response(dict(detail="Bad payload"), status=status.HTTP_400)
```

```
POST /api/auth/login/begin/
```

```
HTTP 200 OK
```

```
Allow: POST, OPTIONS
```

```
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
Vary: Accept
```

```
{
  "publicKey": {
    "challenge": "bPKMjT4wymW5wUrpYwL+oLMobmwKBabKxLg9ZPn3c=",
    "rpId": "www.thevolny.net",
    "allowCredentials": [
      {
        "type": "public-key",
        "id": "NCM9oWPQTvQ+Tq2JjdbeI0wdfsyvniVxNwm5zrwmyEMqZKXAWYIK8lqevgUsrmVeDsNzXcvj4A5UxywM0kaX8Q=="
      },
      {
        "type": "public-key",
        "id": "RmabtV1bLXHSbqGotJGTKJ7+kzLEhZpRGiWSMIHVxLZ5z6DWB7CuSShJHMPU4b1R+X87uVUmAVNqDmQuCzIHzw=="
      }
    ],
    "userVerification": "preferred"
  }
}
```

Media type:

application/json

Content:

{"username": "chris"}

```
class PasswordlessBackend(backends.ModelBackend):
```

```
    def authenticate(self, request, passwordless=False, username=None, **kwargs):
```

```
        if passwordless:
```

```
            try:
```

```
                return get_user_model().objects.get(username=username)
```

```
            except:
```

```
                pass
```



SECURE

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My Demo – Login Complete

- Gives:
 - credentialId
 - clientDataJSON
 - authenticatorData
 - Signature
- Gets:
 - Detail + UserInfo
 - username
 - full_name
 - is_staff

```
class WebauthnLogin(BaseWebauthnLoginView):
    """
    Webauthn Login Complete View

    Given anonymous user, state from login-begin in session, and the client's response, complete the login
    ritual, and if valid, log the user in.
    """
    def post(self, request, format=None):
        logger.info(f'webauthn-login.{format}: {request.data}')
        if request.user.is_authenticated:
            return Response(dict(detail="Already authenticated"), status=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED)
        authargs = {k: v for k, v in request.data.items() if k in settings.FIDO2.LOGIN_FIELDS }
        try:
            user = auth.authenticate(request, passwordless=True, **authargs)
        except:
            user = None
        if user:
            state = request.session.get(settings.FIDO2.SESSION_STATE_KEY)
            cred_id = request.data.get('credentialId', None)
            client_json = request.data.get("clientDataJSON", None)
            auth_value = request.data.get("authenticatorData", None)
            signature = request.data.get("signature", None)
            if client_json and auth_value and signature:
                client_data = ClientData(client_json)
                auth_data = AuthenticatorData(auth_value)
                credentials = [ x.credential for x in user.authenticators.all() ]
                if state and credentials and cred_id and client_data and auth_data and signature:
                    try:
                        if SERVER.authenticate_complete(state, credentials, cred_id, client_data, auth_data, signature):
                            auth.login(request, user)
                            return Response(dict(detail="OK", user=getuser(user)))
                    except Exception as e:
                        logger.warn(f'Exception webauthn-login.{format} {authargs}: {e}')
            return Response(dict(detail="Bad request"), status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
        return Response(dict(detail="Bad username"), status=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED)
```


Design Considerations

- Single (passwordless) or Multifactor?
 - What's your env's posture?
 - Adaptive?
 - Username-less?
- Requirement Parameters
 - Authenticator type
 - Platform
 - Cross-platform
 - User Verification
 - Warm body, pin, biometric?
 - Attestation Level
 - Identity vs privacy

PRODUCT / ADAPTIVE ACCESS POLICIES

Security Policies for Every Situation

Get granular about who can access what and when. Duo lets you create custom access policies based on role, device, location, and many other contextual factors.



Instantly respond to changing user context.



Protect specific apps and networks.




Fully customize security policies.

§ 4. Terminology

Attestation

Generally, *attestation* is a statement that serves to bear witness, confirm, or authenticate. In the WebAuthn context, [attestation](#) is employed to provide verifiable evidence as to the origin of an [authenticator](#) and the data it emits. This includes such things as [credential IDs](#), [credential key pairs](#), [signature counters](#), etc.



Additional Notes

- Hybrid Password/Passwordless?
 - Challenge for username enumeration
- Do not roll your own crypto/security
- CBOR vs Base64
- Django Views/API to React = awkward
 - JSON blobs?

```
{ "username": "chris" }
```

```
A1                                     # map(1)
  68                                   # text(8)
    757365726E616D65                 #
  "username"                           #
    65                               # text(5)
    6368726973                       # "chris"
```

```
@render_to('index.html')
def react(request, path=''):
    path=f'/{path}'
    page = get_object_or_None(FlatPage, url=path)
    code = status.HTTP_200_OK if page else status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
    return render(request, 'index.html', context={
        'data': {
            'user': getuser(request.user),
            'page': getpage(page),
            'url': path,
            'csrf': csrf.get_token(request),
            'status': code,
        },
    }, status=code)
```

```
<body>
  <noscript>You need to enable JavaScript to run this app.</noscript>
  <div id="root"></div>
  {{ data|json_script:'data' }}
</body>
```

Questions?

- WebAuthn 101 <https://webauthn.guide/>
- Duo WebAuthn Demo <https://webauthn.io/>
- FIDO Alliance <https://fidoalliance.org/>
- Django Extension <https://github.com/cvolny/django-restauthn/>
- React WebAuthn Client Library
<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@cvolny/webauthn-client>



Thank You!



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